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MACRO- AND MICRO-LEVEL EFFECTS ON 




There are several obvious and directly causative reasons why the global finan-
cial system nearly collapsed in late 2008. Consider, for example, striking 
regulatory gaps, the limited reach of national regulators in the face of global 
banks and shadow banks, inadequate regulatory staffing and capacity, moral 
hazard and the developments of perverse incentives toward excessive risk-
taking, the masking of risk-shifting as risk-management, and the conviction 
in some quarters that self-interested, market-driven private action could sub-
stitute for regulatory oversight. A large and ever-growing body of multidisci-
plinary scholarship has been unearthing and investigating the roots and cata-
lysts of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
Different scholars have taken different approaches to the question of 
where to go in the wake of the financial crisis—that is, how to design a regu-
latory system that is simultaneously robust, credible, and flexible; that better 
incentivizes firms toward socially beneficial goals without completely re-
nouncing regulatory capitalism;1 that “sees around corners” better than any 
regulator and most of those in industry have managed to do in the last dec-
                                                                    
† Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. I am grateful to Ed 
Balleisen, Sharon Gilad, Neil Gunningham, Fiona Haines, and participants at faculty 
workshops at UBC and the Université de Montréal faculté de droit for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1  David Levi-Faur, “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism” (2005) 598 Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 12. 
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ade;2 and that rewards expertise and innovation, without permitting the 
alarming concentrations of power that make banks too big to fail and regula-
tors too cowed (or too captured) to further their public-regarding mandate. 
Saule Omarova, for example, notes that the lack of workable alternative 
methods for regulating global financial players compels a defense of ongoing 
self-regulation in the financial markets. Analogizing from the “Responsible 
Care” initiative in the chemical industry, Omarova argues that financial 
firms’ recognition of their common destiny, and of the broad reputational 
damage that could be inflicted on all of them as a result of catastrophic error, 
will push the financial industry toward more responsible self-regulation.3  
Many other scholars, though fully aware that self-regulation will have to 
play a central part in an industry as fluid, powerful, fast-moving, and global 
as the financial industry, are now putting more emphasis on the need for 
stronger state or public oversight to put a brake on short term and self-
interested industry conduct. The calls for regulatory restructuring have been 
many over the last few years.4 Among other innovative proposals is John 
Braithwaite’s for a restorative justice model for banks, with negative licensing 
as a key element.5 Ken Bamberger has also advocated a more activist regula-
tory model as a response to the problems of accountability, transparency, and 
                                                                    
2  The injunction to “see around corners” dates from the immediate post-Enron era: Testi-
mony Concerning Resource Allocations and Strategic Planning, James M McConnell, before 
the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Efficiency and Financial Management, 
Committee on Government Reform (20 April 2004), online: US Securities and Exchange 
Commission <http://www.sec.gov>. 
3  Saule T Omarova, “Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation” (2011) 159 U Pa L Rev 411 at 449–53. The analogy with the Responsible 
Care program is Omarova’s, but see also Neil Gunningham, “Environment, Self-
Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible Care” (1995) 17:1 Law & 
Pol’y 57. 
4  See e.g. Lucian A Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, “Regulating Bankers’ Pay” (2010) 98 Geo 
LJ 247; Robert Hockett, “A Fixer-Upper for Finance” (2010) 87:6 Wash UL Rev 1213; 
Andrew W Lo, “Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008” 
(2009) 1:1 Journal of Financial Economic Policy 4; Luigi Zingales, “The Future of Securi-
ties Regulation” (2009) 47:2 Journal of Accounting Research 391. 
5  John Braithwaite, “Restorative Justice for Banks Through Negative Licensing” (2009) 
49:4 Brit J Crim 439 [Braithwaite, “Negative Licensing”]. 
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reasoning introduced, in particular, by computer code-based internal risk 
management systems.6 Calls for reform in the United States were responded 
to, in part, through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act.7 Of course, new regulatory initiatives still need to grapple with the 
difficult problems of innovation, dynamicism, and complexity that character-
ize this industry. 
Within the body of scholarship on the financial crisis, a particular subset 
has been preoccupied with the implications of the crisis for those modern 
regulatory approaches that moved away from rigid, prescriptive regulatory 
standards, toward more dynamic and context-specific standards developed in 
concert with regulated actors. Among these is Ian Ayres and John 
Braithwaite’s concept of “enforced self-regulation”.8 This is an important ave-
nue for inquiry, though one where the scope for misunderstanding may be 
substantial. The regulatory regimes that permitted the financial crisis to oc-
cur were predominantly not enforced self-regulatory regimes. In many cases 
they were self-regulatory or even outright deregulatory. Nor were the gaps in 
real life regulatory spheres of responsibility prescribed by the enforced self-
regulatory approach, or by the broader concept of “responsive regulation” 
that Ayres and Braithwaite developed almost two decades ago, and in which 
enforced self-regulation is embedded.9 For scholars of regulation, to ask 
about the relationship between responsive regulation and the recent financial 
crisis risks being seen as ascribing the blame for the crisis to these regulatory 
approaches, rather than to the broad problems identified above. This would 
                                                                    
6  Kenneth Bamberger, “Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital 
Age” (2010) 88:4 Tex L Rev 669 at 729–38. See also Erik F Gerding, “Code, Crash, and 
Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global 
Financial Crisis” (2009) 84:2 Wash L Rev 127 at 189–94, responding to a similar prob-
lem of the “new financial code”, Gerding argues for more public input and transparency, 
in the sense of having regulators promote “open source” software in codes or models used 
to market financial products. 
7  Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
8  “Enforced self-regulation” and related approaches are described more fully in Part II, 
below. 
9  Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation De-
bate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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be to misunderstand the crisis, responsive regulation itself, and the some-
times considerable distance between intent and implementation.10  
That said, the financial crisis does demand that some careful work be 
done to investigate the essential preconditions for enforced self-regulation 
and other similar approaches.11 As this paper attempts to demonstrate, cer-
tain elements of contemporary financial regulation, particularly the emphasis 
on partial delegation of interpretive and definitional matters to industry, 
contain insights relevant to responsive regulation—even though these meth-
ods were so poorly implemented in this context as to hardly resemble the 
theoretical original. The precise nature of the relationship between the regu-
lator and the financial industry also deserves attention. Regulation cannot be 
understood without reference to the broader social, political, and institu-
tional contexts that contain it. Beyond pure regulatory design, the financial 
crisis makes clear that questions about the appropriate regulatory mix of 
strategies do not take place in isolation from questions of power and influ-
ence, which directly affect feasibility and effectiveness in practice. It also 
makes clear that actually operationalizing any regulatory method is bound to 
meet entirely unexpected challenges.  
The purpose of this article is to consider what the experience of the fi-
nancial crisis can teach scholars of enforced self-regulation and related ap-
proaches, by widening the scope of inquiry and considering the broader set 
of forces that operate on any regulatory structure. The article argues that 
enforced self-regulation and other process-based regulatory approaches 
would benefit from building in, at a structural level, greater attention to both 
“macro” forces, such as the background influence of power, and “micro” 
forces, such as the form, nature, and drivers of incremental change within the 
interstices of any flexible regulatory process. It closes with a few observations 
                                                                    
10  Reportedly, at a festschrift for Gunther Teubner in April 2009, Teubner was jokingly de-
scribed as having caused the financial crisis through the widespread adoption of his theo-
retical approach. 
11  See e.g. Gráinne de Búrca, “New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction” 
[2010] Wis L Rev 227 at 237–38 (considering how scholars of new or experimentalist 
governance may interpret practical failures of their theory). 
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about potential tools available to responsive regulators for addressing the 
problems identified. 
II. RESPONSIVE REGULATION AND THE SCHOLARSHIP IT 
HAS INFLUENCED 
The goal of Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite’s influential 1992 book Respon-
sive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate was exactly that: to 
“transcend the intellectual stalemate between those who favour strong state 
regulation of business and those who advocate deregulation.”12 The model 
that Ayres and Braithwaite put forward envisions a more flexible, responsive, 
and iterative relationship between regulator and industry, and a less dogmati-
cally drawn distinction between the public and private spheres. The key 
mechanism is “enlightened” delegation,13 meaning careful allocation of regu-
latory functions to specific actors (public interest groups,14 unregulated 
competitors of regulated firms,15 or regulated firms themselves16) reinforced 
all the while by a credible and intelligent public regulatory presence operat-
ing along tit-for-tat-based regulatory17 and enforcement18 pyramids, and 
holding in reserve a “benign big gun”.19 At the crucial intermediate layers of 
the regulatory pyramid is “enforced self-regulation,” an arrangement under 
which firms are required endogenously to develop their own set of context-
specific conduct rules, which are then publicly ratified and capable of public 
enforcement.20 
                                                                    
12  Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 9 at 3. 
13  Ibid at 4. 
14  Ibid at 54–100. 
15  Ibid at 101–32. 
16  Ibid at 133–57. 
17  Ibid at 38–40. 
18  Ibid at 35–38. 
19  Ibid at 19–30, 40–51. 
20  Ibid at 101–16. 
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The responsive regulation approach, along with the larger body of John 
Braithwaite’s work, has been seminal to the development of what Sharon 
Gilad recently characterized as a “family” of “process-oriented” regulatory 
approaches.21 Gilad’s typology is a useful framework (though I express a few 
quibbles below) for locating John Braithwaite’s responsive regulation work in 
the context of the more recent regulatory scholarship it has helped to gener-
ate. Distinguishing between regulatory design approaches permits precision. 
It also suggests that this article’s observations about micro- and macro-level 
effects on regulatory design are relevant to other, similar contemporary regu-
latory models. 
In her article, Gilad classifies regulatory institutional models into three 
ideal forms, which she goes on to compare based on such criteria as the de-
gree of rule adaptation to individual circumstances, costs incurred by regula-
tors, regulatory learning and long-term capacity building, and mechanisms 
shaping firms’ cooperation and performance.22 The first institutional form is 
the prescriptive form, consistent with what is generally recognized as com-
mand-and-control regulation. The second institutional form is outcome-
oriented regulation, which includes performance-based, standards-based, and 
principles-based regulation.23 Within the outcome-oriented ideal type, regu-
lators develop output specifications, which are closely associated with regula-
tory goals and generally cast at a high level of generality, and evaluate regu-
lated actors’ compliance based on whether they achieve acceptable results. As 
such, it is a model that can function in situations where the regulated indus-
try is heterogeneous and background conditions are subject to change. Note, 
however, that Gilad’s pure form of outcome-oriented regulation puts all of its 
eggs in the outcome-oriented basket, meaning that it contains no explicit 
requirement that outcomes be achieved through defensible processes or 
mechanisms. To make it work, what regulators (and, ideally, regulated actors) 
need is some reasonable understanding of what “good” outcomes look like.24  
                                                                    
21  Sharon Gilad, “It Runs in the Family: Meta-Regulation and Its Siblings” (2010) 4:4 Regu-
lation & Governance 485 at 486 [Gilad, “Family”]. 
22  Ibid, especially table 3 at 494–95. 
23  Ibid at 486–89.  
24  Ibid table 1 at 487. 
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The third institutional form in Gilad’s typology is process-oriented regu-
lation. Process-based models focus on systems and controls, rather than out-
comes. Like outcome-oriented regulation, process-oriented regulation is 
well-suited to environments in which regulated actors are heterogeneous and 
background conditions are unstable, meaning that one-size-fits-all regulatory 
prescriptions and rigid rules are unworkable. Included in the process-based 
category are management-based regulation,25 enforced self-regulation,26 “new 
governance” principles-based regulation,27 and meta-regulation.28 Gilad’s ap-
proach focuses particularly on two representative forms: management-based 
regulation and meta-regulation. 
In terms of the availability and soundness of the information they are 
built around, Gilad describes management-based regulation as a “second best 
solution” relative to outcome-oriented regulation. Unlike outcome-oriented 
regulation, management-based regulation is viable where regulators do not 
have a reasonable understanding of what good outcomes look like, but (along 
with regulated actors) do at least have a reasonable understanding of what 
good control systems look like. Management-based regulation thus designs 
process specifications around what constitutes acceptable planning and im-
plementation of systems and controls. Meta-regulation, the other version of 
process-oriented regulation, inhabits an even more indeterminate space. 
Here, neither regulators nor regulated actors have more than a limited, pro-
visional, and contingent understanding of what good outcomes or even good 
control systems might look like.29 Meta-regulation therefore focuses on learn-
                                                                    
25  See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, “Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals” (2003) 37:4 Law and Soc’y Rev 691. 
26  See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 9; John Braithwaite, “Enforced Self-Regulation: A 
New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control” (1982) 80:7 Mich L Rev 1466.  
27  Cristie Ford, “New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regula-
tion” (2008) 45:1 Am Bus LJ 1 [Ford, “New Governance”]. Note that Gilad locates the 
author’s version of principles-based regulation within meta-regulation, not outcome-
oriented regulation: Gilad, “Family”, supra note 21 at 502. 
28  Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
29  Gilad, “Family”, supra note 21, table 1 at 487. 
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ing, rather than knowing. That is, it focuses on determining whether the sys-
tems and controls being used are designed to both generate and respond to 
ongoing learning, thereby improving outcomes as measured by reference to a 
high-level set of principles.30 Both forms of process-based regulation require 
substantial regulatory capacity. 
Gilad’s typology is useful and insightful. Even so, one might question 
whether her description of outcome-oriented regulation has been narrowed 
too much, for the sake of distinguishing it from meta-regulation in particu-
lar. Specifically, it may be misleading to describe outcome-oriented regula-
tion as based on a greater degree of certainty or knowledge than manage-
ment-based regulation, the “second best solution”, can lay claim to. For one 
thing, means and ends continually and mutually revise themselves. A feed-
back relationship exists between what counts as a good control system and 
what counts as a good outcome, meaning that outcomes and processes are 
not so clearly distinguished. Moreover, outcome-oriented regulation, when 
characterized by careful attention to revisability and contingency and when 
outcomes are defined in multifactorial and nuanced ways, can be richer than 
Gilad’s presentation permits.  
Even accepting the distinction, it is not necessarily the case that a regula-
tor is operating in a more certain universe if she has a good understanding of 
what a good outcome looks like, as opposed to having a good understanding 
of what a good control system looks like. When comparing outcome-
oriented and management-based regulation, the question is not degrees of 
certainty so much as what one has knowledge about. Management-based 
regulation makes sense when one has a good understanding of control sys-
tems, even if not of outcomes. Outcome-oriented regulation makes sense 
where one has a good understanding of outcomes, even if not (perhaps be-
cause of limited regulator knowledge or industry heterogeneity) of the con-
trol systems most suited to reaching those outcomes. Both management-
based regulation and outcome-oriented regulation focus on the aspect they 
know relatively more about, or that they can better measure. 
The second, related question is whether it makes sense to situate meta-
regulation and management-based regulation within an overarching category 
                                                                    
30  Ibid. 
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of process-based regulation, rather than distinguishing meta-regulation from 
all other categories. This is because unlike outcome-oriented and manage-
ment-based regulation, Gilad’s meta-regulation (and this approach also spans 
experimentalism and new governance)31 directly confronts what the regula-
tor does not know, and tries to build learning systems to work with it. Seen 
from this perspective, the most significant distinction is between meta-
regulation and everything else.  
Especially in the context of the fast-moving and complex financial mar-
kets, it may make more sense to assess regulatory approaches not in terms of 
the information they work with, but rather in terms of the strategies they 
possess to grapple with uncertainty and lack of information. Certainly, one 
would prefer an environment not characterized by pervasive uncertainty, 
where one had a good appreciation of what either a good outcome or a good 
control system looked like. However, an approach that focuses on what is 
known may not do an especially good job of dealing with the unknown. The 
financial markets, of course, have been and continue to be characterized by 
vast areas of Knightian uncertainty.32 In the financial crisis, it was not the 
known that was the problem but rather the unknown. Regulators using man-
                                                                    
31  Experimentalism and new governance share features, including some degree of delegated 
decision-making to regulated actors and an emphasis on information-based decision-
making that is capable of evolving through time. See e.g. Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: 
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought” 
(2005) 89:2 Minn L Rev 342; Bradley C Karkkainen, “New Governance in Legal 
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping” (2005) 
89:2 Minn L Rev 471. What Gilad calls process-based approaches (including 
Braithwaitean enforced self-regulation) tend to look beyond the dyadic regula-
tor/regulated actor relationship, envisioning a more general breakdown of the pub-
lic/private divide and a larger and more varied group of players participating in govern-
ance. See e.g. Lester M Salamon, ed, The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Gov-
ernance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Jody Freeman, “The Private Role in 
Public Governance” (2000) 75:3 NYUL Rev 543. 
32  See Frank Hyneman Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1921), discussing the difference between risk and uncertainty. On the impact of uncer-
tainty in the financial crisis, see e.g. Steven L Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity in Finan-
cial Markets” (2010) 87:2 Wash UL Rev 211; Jeffrey M Lipshaw, “The Epistemology of 
the Financial Crisis: Complexity, Causation, Law, and Judgment” (2010) 19:2 S Cal In-
terdisciplinary LJ 299. 
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agement-based and outcome-oriented methods, but not meta-regulatory 
methods, are not equipped with the tools to deal with significant uncer-
tainty. Consciously or unconsciously, they may overestimate the degree of 
knowledge they have, or ignore troubling uncertainty because they lack the 
tools to confront it. To make outcome-oriented or management-based meth-
ods work, regulators may consciously or unconsciously fail to acknowledge 
gaps in knowledge, paper over them, or fill them in an ad hoc, nontranspar-
ent, and unsystematic manner. It would be far better to design a system that is 
capable ab initio of recognizing and responding to the unknown as well as 
the known.  
Some elements of Ayres and Braithwaite’s responsive regulation ap-
proach, such as the “benign big gun” or the “tit-for-tat” approach, are ecu-
menical (when taken out of the context of the rest of the book) and could 
apply across Gilad’s typology. The enforced self-regulation piece, however, is 
perhaps the original form of management-based regulation. It describes a 
process of negotiation between regulator and each regulated actor, to estab-
lish regulations that are particularized to that actor. It is therefore sensitive to 
institutional heterogeneity and evolving conditions. Each firm proposes its 
own regulatory standards (that is, outcomes) to the regulator. Consistent 
with Gilad’s narrative, the regulator requires the firm to do its own self-
regulation for epistemological and resource-based reasons. Enforced self-
regulation is underpinned by convictions about the utility and wisdom of 
regulator/industry dialogue, and the prudent use of regulatory resources, 
such that regulators “steer rather than row” (to use the language of the early 
1990s).33 The assumption is that the regulator itself is in an inferior position, 
relative to industry, to establish regulatory rules, monitor for noncompliance, 
or punish and correct episodes of noncompliance. Nevertheless, the self-
regulation is “enforced” in that it is embedded within an escalating regula-
tory pyramid model. If the firm fails to propose and realize its own regula-
tory standards, it is subject to harsher default standards imposed by the state. 
                                                                    
33  David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit 
is Transforming the Public Sector (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992).  
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Where an intransigent actor sets standards but subsequently fails to self-
regulate, its internally developed standards are also publicly enforceable.34 
The reason the distinction between meta-regulation and everything else 
matters to the Ayres and Braithwaite approach is that while responsive regu-
lation circa 1992 embraces sensitivity to context, as do outcome-oriented and 
management-based regulation, it does not explicitly locate systematic learn-
ing at the core of the regulatory project in the way that meta-regulation does. 
While it envisions an ongoing, tit-for-tat engagement between regulatory 
staffer and regulated actor, enforced self-regulation does not stipulate that a 
dedicated mechanism be established for systematically gleaning insights from 
regulatory experience and ploughing those insights back into regulatory 
practice.35 The main thesis of this article is that in the absence of carefully 
designed structures for learning-by-doing, lacunae in understanding can be 
filled in in ways that reflect “macro level” power relationships and “micro 
level” idiosyncrasies in implementation, rather than regulatory intention. 
This is a problem that the next section of this article seeks to describe in 
greater detail. 
Significantly, John Braithwaite’s updated description of responsive regula-
tion in this volume emphasizes learning to a much greater degree.36 The new 
article proposes a “clarification of the core of the theory” and a “simple re-
formulation of the theory as nine principles of responsive regulation”.37 In 
fact, it is both a clarification and an evolution. Abiding is the theory’s empha-
sis on dialogue, contextual sensitivity, and an escalating range of sanctions 
with an initial preference for the most collaborative forms of interaction (e.g. 
support and education).38 Newly emphasized are the needs to engage those 
who resist with fairness and respect, to network pyramidal governance, and 
                                                                    
34  Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 9 at 101–09. 
35  Ibid at 111–12 (enforced self-regulation would foster regulatory innovation, but “[a] 
combination of regulatory vigilance, tripartite accountability, and civil liability for dam-
ages to victims would have to be counted on to control the excesses of experimentation”). 
36  Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 475 
[Braithwaite, “Essence”]. 
37  Ibid at 476. 
38  Ibid at 503. 
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to learn.39 In these respects, the nine principles of responsive regulation iden-
tified in Professor Braithwaite’s new work show the clear imprint not only of 
his ongoing work on restorative justice, but also the influence of meta-
regulation. 
III. TWO CHALLENGES FOR FLEXIBLE REGULATION  
Enforced self-regulation, management-based regulation, meta-regulation, 
and any nuanced version of outcome-oriented regulation (collectively called 
“flexible regulation” below) all require substantial regulatory capacity to op-
erate effectively. Over and above capacity challenges, however, flexible and 
iterative regulatory strategies like these are also far more porous to external 
influence than prescriptive regulation would be. In subtle and overt ways, 
these regulatory methods are open to the influence of forces from different 
planes of action. In this section, I describe those external influences as com-
ing from the macro plane of power and political agenda-setting, and the mi-
cro plane of variability, contingency, and imperfection within the incre-
mental moments of implementing regulation. In addition to being supported 
by adequate regulatory capacity, in order to be effective, flexible regulation 
must be capable of registering these factors and their influence on formal 
regulatory design, and responding to them. While all four forms of flexible 
regulation are built to evolve through time, I contend that only meta-
regulation (including the updated version of responsive regulation in this 
volume) has been designed to manage the change process in an adequately 
conscious way, because of its focus on learning from experience. 
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, financial and securities regu-
lation had evolved significantly in the direction of flexible and, especially, 
devolved and iterative regulation, in ways that were at least superficially con-
sistent with responsive regulation and flexible regulation generally. A par-
ticular history exists around the development of flexible regulation in securi-
ties regulation. In contrast to the standard image of the administrative 
agency bureaucracy, modern financial regulation, and especially securities 
regulation, was not a classic command-and-control system to start with. 
Since the inception of modern securities regulation in the Depression era, it 
                                                                    
39  Ibid. 
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has been a disclosure-oriented, rather than merit-based, system, reflecting 
deep support for market mechanisms and for the basic autonomy of the pub-
lic companies that raise capital in those markets. In this environment, it has 
always been a given that centralized bureaucracies are too distant from cor-
porate practice and too lacking in information to prescribe detailed rule-
based requirements concerning key aspects of business operation.40 The no-
tion of moving toward a more collaborative, responsive, and flexible regula-
tory structure seemed to dovetail especially well with this regulatory envi-
ronment. 
The conversation around principles-based securities regulation captured 
the way in which contemporary thinking about the wisdom and viability of 
flexible regulation was translated into this context.41 Principles-based regula-
tors such as the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the British Co-
lumbia Securities Commission argued that prescriptive, one-size-fits-all regu-
latory requirements produced a mismatch between regulatory goals and 
regulatory methods, because they encouraged firms to focus on detailed 
compliance rather than on exercising sound judgment with a view to the 
broader best interests of their clients. Detailed and “top-down” requirements 
also calcified the regulatory system to reflect a particular version of industry 
practice at a particular point in time. By contrast, these regulators argued, 
general obligations subject to industry-driven reflection and amendment 
were built to ensure sustainability, and to allow industry practice to evolve 
unhindered by over-regulation. Principles-based drafting also ensured flexi-
bility, in that emerging issues that called for regulation could be addressed in 
the general course, because market participants needed to consider the pur-
pose of the rules in the context of the objectives of securities regulation when 
making any compliance decision.42 
                                                                    
40  This is not to say that every securities regulatory provision is drafted in equally principles-
based terms. On the distinction between, for example, principles-based provisions around 
fraud and rules-based provisions around administrative accountability, see Cristie Ford, 
“Principles-Based Securities Regulation” (Report for the Expert Panel on Securities Regu-
lation: 2009), online: <www.expertpanel.ca> [Ford, “Expert Panel”]. 
41  This section draws on Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 27 at 11–21. 
42  BC Securities Commission, New Proposals for Securities Regulation: A New Way to Regu-
late (2002), online: <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca>. In the same vein, the Securities Commis-
 
602 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL. 44:3 
 
At the BC Securities Commission, outcome-oriented regulation was the 
essential correlate to principles-based regulation. Outcome orientation was 
seen to be more congruent with regulatory goals, mandate, and capacity. Be-
cause industry innovation was so fast-moving, the perception was that regu-
lators that sought to enforce detailed process-based requirements would in-
evitably find themselves playing catch-up and reacting to Enron-style loop-
hole behaviour. Because granular information was decentralized across mul-
tiple industry actors, centralized prescriptive requirements were viewed as 
cumbersome, and understood as less likely to be consistently effective and 
congruent with regulatory goals. Far better be it for regulators to focus on 
articulating and achieving high level regulatory goals, while leaving the de-
tailed articulation of content to industry itself. 
The result in these jurisdictions was a move toward an approach that 
permitted firms to determine for themselves what was required to meet 
broadly defined regulatory goals, such as the need to “[m]aintain an effective 
system to manage the risks associated with [their] business.”43 There was a 
similar shift toward more principles-based language in the Treating Custom-
ers Fairly initiative at the FSA,44 and in the BC Securities Commission’s rec-
ommendations for allowing investment dealers to use their own proprietary 
software, rather than existing rules imposed by self-regulatory organizations, 
to supervise client account handling for churning (excessive trading to in-
                                                                                                                                               
sion argued that the misconduct underlying the recent financial crisis could mostly be ad-
dressed through stronger compliance oversight and enforcement of existing statutory 
provisions, rather than by promulgating new detailed rules: BC Securities Commission, 
Annual Report 2008–2009, online: <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca> at 3. 
43  BC Securities Commission, Securities Regulation in British Columbia: Guide for Dealers 
and Advisors (2004), online: <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca> at 31 (BC’s original, never-in-
force, principles-based regulatory model would have replaced detailed rules of conduct 
for dealers and advisers with an overarching Code of Conduct consisting of 28 rules ar-
ranged under eight broad “standards” of which this is number 20).  
44  See Financial Services Authority, Treating Customers Fairly, online: <http://www 
.fsa.gov.uk>. For a history of the uptake of the Treating Customers Fairly initiative, see 
Sharon Gilad, “Enlisting Commitment to Internal Compliance via Reframing and Dele-
gation” (2010) Center for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (London School of Economics 
and Political Science), Discussion Paper 64, online: <http://www.lse.ac.uk> 
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crease broker commissions) and other misuse of client funds.45 The theoreti-
cal intent of initiatives such as these goes precisely to this power to interpret 
detailed content for high level regulatory principles.46 Effectiveness aside for 
now, the aim of each of these programs was to develop a regulatory system 
that recognized that firms had greater capacity and contextual knowledge 
relative to regulators. It envisioned distinct roles for regulators and industry: 
regulators would set outcomes and establish broad, principles-based re-
quirements, while industry would fill in the detailed procedural strategies by 
which those goals would be reached. 
As measured by the fact of the financial crisis, financial regulation must 
be deemed to have failed generally in this time period. The reasons for failure 
were multiple, and affected both more principles-based and more prescrip-
tive regimes, though the nature of the failure took on a particular cast with 
respect to principles-based regulation.47 The point for current purposes is 
that from that failure, we may glean broader lessons about the ways in which 
flexible regulation is susceptible to the effects of power on the large scale, and 
the particularities of implementation on the small. 
                                                                    
45  Christina Wolf, “Strong and Efficient Investor Protection: Dealers and Advisors Under 
the B.C. Model—A Regulatory Impact Analysis” (2003), online: BC Securities Commis-
sion <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca>.  
46  Ibid. A model closer to self-regulation (or outright deregulation) was the now entirely 
discredited Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) program at the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which allowed the major investment banks to assess their 
own risks and to establish their own capital adequacy thresholds. The fact that the CSE 
program was voluntary, and that staffers charged with overseeing it were so few in number 
and so geographically dispersed, meant that both in design and operationalization the 
program was purely self-regulatory: see SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Enti-
ties: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, Report No 446-A, (Chairman Cox’s 
comments, 25 September 2008), online: Securities and Exchange Commission 
<http://www.sec.gov> at 81. In terms of firms’ ability to define the content of terms 
themselves, however, the difference between the FSA, BC Securities Commission, and 
SEC programs is a matter of degree. 
47  See e.g. Cristie Ford, “Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Financial 
Crisis” (2010) 55:2 McGill LJ 257 [Ford, “Principles”] (on implications of the financial 
crisis for principles-based regulation). 
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A. THE MACRO LEVEL: POWER/INFLUENCE AND AGENDA-SETTING 
1. REGULATION AND THE OVERT EXERCISE OF POWER 
In focusing on the technical design of regulatory strategies, scholars of flexi-
ble regulation sometimes bracket and sometimes back into the very real 
problem of power.48 In the United States, among some politically conserva-
tive scholars, devolutionary mechanisms such as the principle of subsidiarity 
(which argues that social problems should be addressed at the most local 
level that is capable of addressing them) may be indirect methods for taking 
power away from the state and returning it to private actors.49 Other regula-
tory scholars are relatively silent about power. While they speak about dele-
gation or (less generously) “outsourcing”, they may not fully engage with the 
potential political and normative ramifications of a choice to delegate deci-
sion making authority, which, practically speaking, entails a significant shift 
in the balance of power. Speaking about delegation without referencing this 
connection leaves the background power framework operating implicitly. A 
third group of flexible regulation scholars, drawn to versions of participatory 
or republican democratic theory, are optimistic about the emancipatory and 
imaginative potential of delegated decision making. They argue that wicked 
power problems can be, or can only be, solved through carefully regulated 
dialogue.50 The acknowledged difficulty is that far too often, this potential 
fails to be realized in practice.  
                                                                    
48  But see e.g. Susan Sturm, “The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in 
Higher Education” (2006) 29 Harv J L & Gender 247. Sturm’s institutional design rec-
ommendations are specifically aimed at addressing hard-to-detect effects of power ine-
quality. According to Mike Feintuck, American scholarship and regulatory practice is 
more influenced in general by politico-economic analyses than the UK scholarship: Mike 
Feintuck, “Regulatory Rationales Beyond the Economic: In Search of the Public Interest” 
in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Regula-
tion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 39 at 54. 
49  Robert K Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution” 
(2001) 35:1 Ind L Rev 103. 
50  See e.g. Michael C Dorf & Charles F Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism” (1998) 98:2 Colum L Rev 267 at 404–18. 
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Linking the technical scholarship on flexible regulation with accounts of 
power from philosophy and other disciplines would develop it and help to 
unearth some of its assumptions. This is not an easy project, due to problems 
of scope and fit. Power is a contested concept, and the literature on the sub-
ject is vast.51 Colloquially, for example, power is sometimes under-theorized, 
sometimes deterministic, sometimes very abstract, and sometimes part of a 
conversation about politics, not policy. Moreover, the terminology and as-
sumptions around power in political philosophy often seem somewhat or-
thogonal to those in the regulatory literature. Gramsciesque views of power 
as monolithic and determinative have little to offer to more evolutionary, as 
opposed to revolutionary, flexible regulatory strategies. Drawing from the 
same tradition are certain streams of “anti-neoliberalism”, which make no 
allowance for the possibility that a devolved and dialogue-based regulatory 
system can be public-regarding.52 Particularly for advocates of process-based 
regulation, very static definitions of power somewhat miss the point. On the 
other end of the spectrum from the determinists are the Foucauldians, 
though what Foucauldian theory might signify for actual concrete regulatory 
prescriptions is difficult to specify.53 In any case, the conversation often seems 
to operate at some distance from the specifics of regulatory design.  
Beginning to incorporate a more precise and explicit story about power 
into the literature around flexible regulation, in the context of financial regu-
lation, would help us to be realistic about likely outcomes. For example, the 
enforcement pyramid envisioned by responsive regulation requires that a 
regulator be credible with industry. A stark imbalance of power between in-
                                                                    
51  For helpful introductions see e.g. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2d ed (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Mark Haugaard, ed, Power: A Reader (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002). 
52  Perhaps the central definition of power within the anti-neoliberal tradition is Pierre 
Bourdieu’s. See Pierre Bourdieu & Loïs JD Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992 at 119; see generally Pierre Bourdieu, Dis-
tinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, translated by Richard Nice (New York: 
Routledge, 1984). 
53  See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977) for an elaboration of the Foucauldian concept of 
power. 
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dustry and regulator affects that credibility. Even where the regulator con-
sciously seeks to behave rationally, predictably, and responsibly in a manner 
that inclines people to obey the law in a Tyleresque world,54 credibility will 
be affected where regulators have inadequate staff, inadequate political sup-
port, or for whatever other reason are unable to enforce their will vis-à-vis 
powerful players. Identifying the problem in terms of the precise kinds of 
power that we are concerned about makes it possible to develop strategic 
responses that provide an answer to the background power landscape. In 
turn, reference to actual regulatory design and practice has the potential to 
enrich the power conversation by moving beyond static and deterministic 
definitions of power, to consider the ways in which regulatory design, espe-
cially around respectful and highly participatory dialogue, can influence 
background conditions and effect change. 
This article makes no attempt to develop such a nuanced account of 
power. Nor does it suggest that the story of recent financial regulation can be 
entirely explained through the lens of explicit politico-economic power. Cer-
tainly, the volatility of public attention and what Anthony Downs described 
almost four decades ago as the “issue-attention cycle”55 played a role as well. 
Over the last twenty or more years, prudential regulation in particular had 
fallen into a period of “low politics”, during which policy choices were left in 
the hands of a semi-closed epistemic community of bankers, their lawyers, 
and their regulators. Institutionalized norms and assumptions went largely 
unquestioned.56 Other areas of securities regulation—consumer protection 
in the United Kingdom, for example,57 or post-Enron legal reform in the 
                                                                    
54  See Tom Tyler, Why People Obey The Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
55  Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology—The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle’” (1972) 28 
The Public Interest 38. 
56  See e.g. Frank R Baumgartner & Bryan D Jones, Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics, 2d ed (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009). 
57  Sharon Gilad, “Juggling Conflicting Demands: The Case of the UK Financial Ombuds-
man Service” (2009) 19:3 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 661; 
Julia Black, “The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation” 2010 LSE Law Soci-
ety and Economy Working Papers 17, online: London School of Economics 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk> at 18–19. 
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United States58—were in the realm of “high politics” and garnering consider-
able public and political attention. With respect to prudential regulation 
during this period, however, powerful actors were operating relatively unhin-
dered. 
Linked to this discussion of power, this article takes the initial step of 
pointing out a few fairly clear examples of times when the exercise of power 
made the kind of technical regulatory design choices we have been talking 
about (as between outcome-oriented and management-based regulation, for 
example) simply irrelevant. As unremarkable as the point may seem, it bears 
elucidating as a first step in trying to connect the regulatory design literature 
to a broader set of forces. To focus on regulatory theory at the expense of 
looking at the context in which regulatory action is embedded is to look at a 
very thin slice of the picture. We should not assume that sophisticated regu-
latory design within that slice will necessarily be determinative of real life 
outcomes. Regulatory design will remain porous to those forces if attention 
is not paid to the process by which content will be filled in and systematic 
learning generated. 
One way to think about power is in terms of the different, often inc-
ommensurable, sources from which it can derive. Thinking only of the run-
up to the financial crisis and the power held by financial industry actors, a 
number of distinct forms of power may have played a role in creating the 
background conditions that provoked the regulatory changes that favoured 
those wielding the power. For example, scholars have investigated the role 
that political and economic power has played in shaping financial regulation 
through, for example, the industry’s ability to hire lobbyists and fund politi-
cal campaigns.59 Economic power can also be used more directly to force leg-
islators’ hands by changing facts on the ground, as occurred with the de facto 
                                                                    
58  See especially The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 Pub L 107-204, 116 Stat 745; Roberta 
Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance” 
(2005) 114:7 Yale LJ 1521. 
59  See e.g. Christopher Arup, “The Global Financial Crisis: Learning from Regulatory and 
Governance Studies” (2010) 32:3 Law and Pol’y 363 at 365–67.  
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repeal of the Glass Steagall Act (GSA) in the 1990s.60 Consider, also, the 
popular (and populist) tales of cronyist or oligarchic power presented in 
magazine articles by individuals as varied as former International Monetary 
Fund Chief Economist Simon Johnson61 and Rolling Stone journalist Matt 
Taibbi.62 Operating in the background is power deriving from the status quo. 
In other words, the mere fact that particular firms were in positions of influ-
ence made them more likely to maintain those positions of influence.Then 
there is structural power deriving from, for example, financial firms’ ability to 
operate across regulatory jurisdictions and/or engage in regulatory arbitrage. 
Specifically—and this is in some tension with the notion of status quo 
power—consider that global financial institutions were able to credibly 
threaten to exit from either the New York or London financial markets, 
bringing their economically significant capital markets activity with them. 
This reality likely put downward pressure on regulatory standards in both 
jurisdictions.63  
One could equally talk about power in terms of its exercise and effect. For 
example, we could frame the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act, mentioned 
                                                                    
60  The Banking Act of 1933, Pub L 73-66, 48 Stat 162. By the 1990s, the GSA had already 
been considerably weakened by incremental bank incursions through the 1990s, but the 
merger between Citicorp, Inc. and Travelers Group, Inc. (which formed Citigroup) 
greatly influenced the government’s repeal of the GSA with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
Pub L 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 [GLBA]. Some have even suggested that “Citigroup [was] 
not the result of [the GLBA] but the cause of it”: Kenneth H Thomas, “Don’t Underes-
timate the Power of Sandy Weill”, Letter to the Editor, Business Week (30 September 
2002) 18.  
61  Simon Johnson, “The Quiet Coup”, The Atlantic 303:4 (May 2009) 46. 
62  Matt Taibbi, “The Great American Bubble Machine”, Rolling Stone 1082/1083 (7 Sep-
tember 2009) 52. 
63  For a discussion of regulatory arbitrage, see Joel Houston, Chen Lin & Yue Ma, “Regula-
tory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows” (18 December 2009), online: Social Sci-
ence Research Network <http://ssrn.com>. See also John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, 
Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), describing 
global taxation as a problem of fit between uninodal banks and corporations operating 
multinationally, arrayed against multi-nodal national regulatory regimes subject to coor-
dination problems. 
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above, as an overt exercise of power,64 which may even have put in train the 
conditions for publicly-funded bailouts of too-big-to-fail banks engaged in 
excessive risk- taking on their proprietary accounts.65 Scholars have also iden-
tified a positive relationship, in the United States in the 1999–2007 period, 
between the degree of risk taken by specific mortgage lending organizations 
and those organizations’ targeted political activity and lobbying efforts to 
defeat laws against predatory lending.66 Similarly, the US Securities and Ex-
change Commission established the disastrous Consolidated Supervised En-
tities Program, under which the same large financial institutions were per-
mitted to ignore conventional capital requirements in favour of capital ade-
quacy ratios determined based on their own internal risk analysis, as a direct 
result of an “urgent plea” by the large investment banks.67 Some suggest that 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (a.k.a. the 
Financial Reform Act) signed by President Obama on 21 July 2010 has also 
been weakened as a result of industry lobbyist pressure.68  
These chronologies have received considerable attention, though there is 
still work to be done in testing these significant claims and tying them to the 
rich and varied scholarly literature concerning the nature of power and the 
                                                                    
64  Lukes, supra note 51 (describing the exercise of power along three dimensions: overt, 
covert, and normative). 
65  See Sandra L Suarez and Robin Kolodny, “Paving the Road to ‘Too Big to Fail’: Business 
Interests and the Politics of Financial Deregulation in the United States” (2011) 39:1 Pol 
& Soc’y 74. 
66  Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel “A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the 
Financial Crisis” (2009) IMF Working Paper 287, online: <http://www 
.imf.org>. 
67  Stephen Labaton, “The Reckoning: Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and 
Risk” The New York Times (October 3, 2008) A1; US Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Alternative Net-Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are Part of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities (2004), online: Securities and Exchange Commission 
<http://www.sec.gov>. See also SEC, supra note 46; Yalman Onaran, “Wall Street Gets 
Lift from SEC that may Boost Profit”, Bloomberg (11 June 2007), online: 
<http://www.bloomberg.com>. 
68  Pub L 111-203, 124 Stat 1376. See e.g. John Cassidy, “The Volcker Rule”, The New Yorker 
86:21 (26 July 2010) 25. 
610 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL. 44:3 
 
limitations of this lens for understanding causality. More consequential to 
flexible regulation, however, is what Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz have 
framed in terms of agenda-setting power.69 In the recent history of financial 
regulation, agenda-setting power operated in subtle ways whose effects we are 
only now coming to appreciate. 
2. AGENDA-SETTING POWER IN THREE MOVES 
At the level of regulatory implementation, and particularly of implementa-
tion of flexible regulation in the financial sector, the “agenda-setting” dimen-
sion of power can play a significant role. Agenda-setting power is the power 
to decide what will be discussed. It is significant in any regime, but it takes on 
even greater significance within flexible regulatory regimes. Especially in 
flexible systems that evolve more or less organically, without conscious atten-
tion to who is setting the agenda and the implications for regulatory mandate 
and goals, agenda-setting power can exert significant and often underappre-
ciated sway. 
In the context of financial regulation, the regulatory agenda was substan-
tially framed around three related claims: first, that modern financial markets 
were too fast-moving and complex to be regulated in a “command-and-
control” way; second, that the innovative potential of the financial sector was 
of great social benefit and needed to be preserved and respected; and third, 
that the size of the regulatory burden on the financial sector was problematic. 
Enhanced emphasis on regulatory consultation with industry actors, and on 
finding industry-centred solutions, was part of emerging regulatory practice 
during this era.70 
                                                                    
69  Peter Bachrach & Morton S Baratz, “Two Faces of Power” (1962) 56:4 Am Pol Sci Rev 
947. 
70  The best example of this focus on consultation may be the FSA in the UK. See Better 
Regulation Action Plan: What We Have Done and What We Are Doing (2005), online: 
FSA <http://www.fsa.gov.uk> at 9–12. This major joint study (undertaken with the 
FSA’s Financial Services Practitioner Panel) describes the December 2005 Better Regula-
tion Action Plan , which was aimed at “improving [the FSA’s] business capability and ef-
fectiveness.” The joint study focused, inter alia, on “looking closely at the costs we [the 
FSA] impose”, “reducing bureaucracy”, “emphasizing senior management responsibility” 
(as opposed to developing prescriptive rules around money laundering, in this case), “less 
 
2011 MACRO- AND MICRO-LEVEL EFFECTS 611 
 
The problem is not that these assumptions are false. Taking the first 
point, global financial markets are obviously fast-moving and complex. The 
difficulty is rather that, by framing the agenda around the inevitability of 
speed and complexity in global financial markets, regulators lost the ability 
to articulate a regulatory agenda independent from the panicked need to 
“keep up” with industry developments. Malcolm Sparrow suggested some 
years ago that the trick to effective regulation was to “pick important prob-
lems and fix them”.71 Regulators came to understand the important problem 
they had to solve as the need to stay abreast of industry-driven developments. 
They sought to solve this problem in more and less effective ways (in terms 
of both theory and practice) using methods such as ongoing consultation, 
principles-based regulation, and “light touch” regulation. These methods can 
surely be effective when properly implemented, but in this case their applica-
tion was limited by a blinkered view of the specific “important problem” they 
were designed to solve. The nature and implications of the speed and com-
plexity of global financial markets, the reasons for it, the concerns it might 
raise, and the broader regulatory reorientation it might demand, were insu-
lated from interrogation. The very difficult question of whether complexity 
can itself be an impediment to effective regulation in any form,72 and if so 
what to do about it, was scarcely raised. 
The examination of innovation was similarly crabbed because the agenda 
was set around regulators’ obligation not to stifle innovation. The argument 
was primarily made regarding the vast expansion of credit and equity deriva-
tives. In retrospect, the beneficial effects of this innovation were not as exten-
sive or significant as industry had argued, and some of the expansion in avail-
able derivatives products was detrimental. As the FSA’s Turner Review 
pointed out in March 2009, the increasing importance of the financial sector 
as a percentage of GDP in the UK and elsewhere was in part due to innova-
tion undertaken for the purpose of rent extraction by financial industry par-
                                                                                                                                               
detailed prescription for training and competence”, and “making life easier for smaller 
firms”. 
71  Malcolm K Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Man-
aging Compliance (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) at 132. 
72  See e.g. Schwarcz, supra note 32. 
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ticipants.73 Innovation was also undertaken to avoid regulation. As Frank 
Partnoy has argued, the primary purpose of derivatives in contemporary capi-
talism was to allow financial institutions to get around regulatory responsi-
bilities.74 British journalist Martin Wolf ’s even broader claim has been that 
“an enormous part of what banks did in the early part of this [past] decade—
the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the derivatives and the ‘shadow banking sys-
tem’ itself—was to find a way round regulation.”75  
In retrospect, it is not surprising that some of the innovations that firms 
were engaging in were expressly designed to circumvent compliance require-
ments.76 Nevertheless, the prevailing assumption in the years leading up to 
the financial crisis was that all innovation was by definition beneficial, be-
cause unsound ideas would be winnowed out by market forces. As a result of 
this assumption, “regulators [had] not considered it their role to judge the 
value of different financial products, and . . . in general avoided direct prod-
uct regulation”.77 Their agenda was rather to get out of the way of industry 
innovation. This made it effectively impossible for regulators to act on con-
cerns—indeed, to legitimately have concerns—about the extraordinary 
growth of the over-the-counter derivatives market. It also prohibited a more 
nuanced examination of varieties of innovation, incentives for innovation, 
and effects of innovation.  
The third assumption underpinning financial regulation over the last 
decade or more has been that, because of the factors above, regulators should 
seek to minimize the regulatory burden on industry. Usually, this priority 
                                                                    
73  UK Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global 
Banking Crisis (March 2009), online: Financial Services Authority <http://www 
.fsa.gov.uk> at 47–49 [Turner Review]. 
74  Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Market 
(New York: Times Books, 2003). 
75  Martin Wolf, “Reform of regulation has to start by altering incentives”, The Financial 
Times (UK) (24 June 2009) 11. 
76  For a more optimistic version of the relationship between innovation in product devel-
opment and innovation in compliance, see Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 27 at 47–
50. 
77  Turner Review, supra note 73 at 49. 
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was formally linked to the need to simultaneously maintain regulatory qual-
ity. For example, the FSA’s then Chief Executive John Tiner claimed that 
principles-based regulation provided qualitatively “better” regulation overall, 
meaning “(1) a stronger probability that statutory outcomes are secured; (2) 
lower cost; and (3) more stimulus to competition and innovation.”78 Regula-
tors at the time would certainly have agreed that the goal was to reduce the 
regulatory burden only to the extent possible without compromising the 
quality of regulatory oversight. When combined with the above views on the 
inevitability of complexity and the benefits of innovation, however, reducing 
the regulatory burden took on outsized importance on the agenda. 
3. NORMATIVE POWER AND TRIPARTISM 
Agenda-setting preceded but also interacted in complex ways with what one 
might call “normative” power. Financial institutions wielded normative 
power because they had the capacity to present compelling and well-crafted 
arguments, and had access to policy makers at multiple levels. Though diffi-
cult to quantify, this power likely also contributed to the deregulatory and 
market discipline-oriented mindset that characterized regulation in recent 
years in the US,79 the UK,80 and elsewhere. In a different historical, political, 
national, and industry environment, flexible regulation would certainly have 
played out differently than it did in the context of early 21st century Anglo-
American financial regulation. In that context, though, agenda-setting and 
content-ascribing powers (discussed below)81 had a broader and mutually 
reinforcing knock-on effect on overarching theories of regulation and social 
ordering. Existing pillars in the normative framework, such as faith in effi-
cient and perfectly orderly markets, were pointed to as justifications for in-
                                                                    
78  John Tiner, “Better Regulation: Objective or Oxymoron” (Speech delivered at the Securi-
ties and Investment Institute Annual Conference, 9 May 2006), online: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk> [emphasis added]. 
79  Johnson, supra note 61. 
80  Turner Review, supra note 73 at 39–46. 
81  See especially infra notes 95–105 and accompanying text. 
614 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL. 44:3 
 
creasingly sweeping convictions about the wisdom of self-regulation.82 This 
in turn contributed to understaffing and under-resourcing of key regulators, 
and to regulatory timidity.83 
In this context, responsive regulation’s notion of tripartism84 did not 
eventuate. It may not even have been a realistic possibility. There were, sim-
ply, insufficient contrary voices within earshot of the regulators during the 
time in question. In part, this is a product of widespread bubble-era opti-
mism that reigned throughout the 2003–2007 era, during which housing 
prices were rising, consumer prices were dropping, and former US Federal 
Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan was widely credited with having successfully 
navigated the aftermath of the dot com bust. This suggests a temporal limita-
tion to the notion of tripartism. In bubble times, skeptics and independent 
thinkers may simply be harder to come upon.  
Additionally, the experience of the financial crisis suggests that injecting a 
meaningfully independent perspective into regulation, by way of tripartism, 
may be more challenging in practice than is sometimes realized. Regulators 
operate within a relatively narrow, insulated, and expertise-based band of 
human experience, characterized by relationships with sophisticated repeat 
players. In spite of their public-regarding mandate they may be cognitively 
predisposed against “outsiders” who either lack facility with the dominant 
jargon, or who take issue with assumptions that no one in the industry takes 
                                                                    
82  See e.g. Paul Krugman, “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?”, The New York Times 
Magazine (6 September 2009) 36. 
83  See FSA Internal Audit Division, The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lessons Learned 
Review (March 2008), online: Financial Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk> 
[FSA, Northern Rock]. The FSA acknowledged extraordinarily high turnover of FSA 
staff directly supervising the bank, inadequate numbers of staff, and very limited direct 
contact with bank executives among the reasons for its “unacceptable” regulatory per-
formance. The SEC’s CSE program was also remarkably understaffed; its Division of 
Trading and Markets only had seven staffers and did not have an executive director. Nev-
ertheless, it was charged with overseeing five otherwise unregulated major broker-dealer 
firms, which formed the backbone of the American-based shadow banking industry.  
84  Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 9 at 54–100, describing a mechanism for deterring 
“harmful” regulatory capture and promoting “efficient capture” by empowering public in-
terest groups as a form of countervailing power, within a reciprocal and dialogic regula-
tory structure. 
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issue with. They are also more likely to share social, educational, or experien-
tial ties with industry actors than with others. Even well-informed activist 
shareholders may not receive the same measure of automatic regulatory re-
spect. In short, it may be that a far greater push is required to force participa-
tion into regulatory conversations than is sometimes imagined by advocates 
and scholars of flexible regulation.85 
B. THE MICRO LEVEL: VAGUENESS, INCREMENTALISM, AND 
PRINCIPLES 
Power also operates at the micro level, as the power to ascribe detailed con-
tent, in specific situations, to regulatory expectations that are only prede-
fined in abstract and general terms. This is the power literally to interpret the 
meanings of regulatory terms—for example, what constitutes “compliance”, 
what is “reasonable”, or what “risks” are significant in relation to one’s busi-
ness.  
Even while ensuring flexibility, the theoretical version of principles-based 
securities regulation before late 2008 was intended to provide sufficient cer-
tainty and avoid granting excessive discretion to regulators—that is, to avoid 
through regulatory design the worst problems associated with principles at 
the level of pure theory. The essential correlate to what I have meant by the 
term “principles-based regulation”, for example, was a systematic method for 
ascribing, in consultation with industry, appropriate and detailed content to 
the high-level principles in question.86 Three strategies were key to the the-
ory. The first was the establishment of mechanisms for interrogating and 
validating the processes by which firms reached the conclusions they did. 
This could be through assessing their decision-making processes, through 
                                                                    
85  One mechanism for addressing the problem is to structure in participatory organs. The 
FSA and, following it, the Canadian Securities Transition Office, have established or pro-
posed Investor Councils to ensure that investors have a greater say in the evolution of se-
curities regulation. Why the Investor Councils in the UK apparently failed to make the 
difference (from a consumer protection perspective in, e.g., the events leading up to the 
failure of Northern Rock) is unclear. 
86  Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 27 at 27–33. 
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ongoing communication and regulatory guidance,87 through a systematic 
effort to measure effectiveness in solving important problems,88 and/or 
through promoting responsible deliberation within firms about matters such 
as compliance and obligations. Second, theoretical principles-based regula-
tion established mechanisms for folding industry best practices and learning 
back to the regulator to enhance regulatory capacity. This was based on the 
pragmatic conviction that solving specific problems in context-appropriate 
ways is effective, but also that the pragmatic “muddling through” model is 
scalable.89 The conviction was that a system founded on incremental situa-
tion-specific problem solving could amount in the aggregate (when accom-
panied by centralized information-gathering and analytic force) to a highly 
effective regulatory structure.90 The third attribute was a strong ex post en-
forcement presence to make principles credible and regulation meaningful.91 
In practice in some arenas, however, flexible regulation was characterized 
by unexpected pathologies at the level of implementation. For example, al-
                                                                    
87  See also Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, “Making a Success of Principles-
Based Regulation” (2007) 1:3 Law and Financial Markets Review 191. 
88  See Sparrow, supra note 71 at 99–122, 155–70. Sparrow found that certain common 
elements characterized the best innovations in regulation: (1) a clear focus on results and 
effectiveness, based on an expanded and more specific set of indicators including “big pic-
ture” high-level impacts, behavioural outcomes (compliance rates, agency activities), and 
resource efficiency; (2) adoption of a disciplined problem solving approach; and (3) an 
investment in collaborative partnerships where feasible.  
89  Charles Lindblom certainly envisioned the “muddling through” method to be scalable in 
this way: Charles E Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’” (1959) 19:2 Pub 
Ad Rev 79 at 80. 
90  This emphasis on a centralized learning and aggregating function appears most strongly 
in the experimentalist literature. See e.g. Charles F Sabel & William H Simon, “Minimal-
ism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State” (2010) Columbia Law Research 
Paper 10-238, available at SSRN, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. The best real-life ex-
ample may be the Arrow II risk assessment program at the FSA. See e.g. Financial Services 
Authority, Operating Framework, Arrow II, online: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk>: “ARROW 
II is designed to identify the main risks to our statutory objectives as they arise and to 
help us plan how to address these risks in line with our regulatory approach”. 
91  See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 9: “the Benign Big Gun”, the “enforcement pyramid”, 
“tit-for-tat”; Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 27 at 25. 
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though principles-based prudential regulation was formally designed around 
a meaningful regulator-industry dialogic process, in practice the regulatory 
presence in the conversation was insufficient. The CSE program and the 
FSA were generally, at least according to their own post-mortem accounts, 
substantially under-resourced.92 (An alternative account may have more to do 
with managerial emphasis on other, more politically important priorities.) 
The FSA did not seem to approach its task with vigour, or with the trans-
formed regulatory mindset required in a principles-based regulatory re-
gime.93 The lack of a robust regulatory presence meant principles-based regu-
lation permitted flexibility, while failing to leverage the potential of those 
principles to guide the course of incremental change. In the result, the mean-
ing of regulatory principles was poorly specified.  
As noted above, principles-based and outcome-oriented regulation was 
not designed to perpetuate continual vagueness around the content of regu-
latory expectations. The idea was that the detailed content of relevant terms 
would be developed incrementally and situation-specifically, but also system-
atically. This is the reason that meta-regulation’s insight about the impor-
tance of developing systems that are capable of learning, including learning 
about the appropriate detailed content one may legitimately ascribe to 
broadly worded principles in particular situations, is so crucial. As William 
Laufer pointed out more than a decade ago, in the absence of an established 
metric for measuring success around concepts such as “compliance”, there will 
not be enforceability or accountability.94 
We now have some insight into the particular ways in which gaps were 
filled in flexible regulation, and they are telling. One significant and previ-
ously unappreciated factor was the automation of many risk and compliance 
processes. As it happens, in the run-up to the financial crisis, human beings 
actually had considerably less conscious, explicit knowledge about how they 
measured their own risk and compliance than anyone realized at the time, or 
than was anticipated by responsive regulation and its family of regulatory 
                                                                    
92  See supra, note 83. 
93  See Northern Rock, supra note 83. 
94  William S Laufer, “Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance” 
(1999) 52 Vand L Rev 1341 at 1393–402. 
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approaches. By the turn of the millennium, risk assessment had necessarily 
become the responsibility of highly sophisticated and complex modeling and 
analytical software. That software was flawed.95 Just as significantly from a 
regulatory design perspective, the increasing reliance on code to manage risk, 
or (as Erik Gerding has described it) the “outsourcing” of risk analysis to firm 
software, has also submerged and obscured contestable assumptions about 
the definition of compliance, and removed them from the ambit of human 
judgment.96 Ken Bamberger has described in similar terms the more general 
phenomenon of managing compliance obligations through software.97 
Insights from behavioural psychology and organizational studies are also 
relevant. Specifically, industry actors operating in the absence of clear signals 
and hard questions from a regulator, aware of their peers’ conduct, and em-
bedded within the self-regulatory zeitgeist, may genuinely take a different 
view of their levels of compliance than regulators or outside auditors would. 
They may be inclined, as part of an adaptive bias within the firm toward 
overconfidence and over-optimism, to overestimate the degree of their own 
compliance, competence, and knowledge.98 Consider the UK’s Corporate 
Governance Code (then the Combined Code). Compliance with the Code 
is required by the Listing Rules for the London Stock Exchange. Studies in-
dicate that 47% of companies self-report themselves to be in full compliance 
with the Code, while independent audits suggest that only thirty-four per 
cent are in full compliance.99 Similar divergence can be seen around the FSA’s 
Treating Customers Fairly initiative. When the program was first introduced, 
and notwithstanding widespread and notorious mis-selling of certain finan-
                                                                    
95  Gerding, supra note 6 at 168–79. 
96  Gerding, supra note 6 at 153–59. 
97  Bamberger, supra note 6. 
98  See e.g. Donald C. Langevoort, “Opening the Black Box of ‘Corporate Culture’ in Law 
and Economics” 162:1 Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 80 (2006) (ar-
guing that cultural over-optimism is an adaptive bias that allows firms to thrive in a com-
petitive market place). 
99  Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or Explain: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance 
with the Combined Code” (2006) 14:5 Corporate Governance: An International Review 
486. 
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cial products, many firms presumed that they were already “treating their 
customers fairly” within the meaning of the regulatory requirement. A pri-
mary factor in forcing firms to reorient themselves with respect to the pro-
gram were FSA studies finding that an overwhelming majority of financial 
firms were not in fact in compliance, reinforced by enforcement action.100 
A recent article by Donald Langevoort helps illuminate the interpersonal 
and unconscious psychological conditions that contribute to gatekeepers’ 
favourable reception of new normative accounts.101 Langevoort’s insights, 
though especially on point with regard to gatekeepers because of their prox-
imity to particular corporate cultures, may also be generalized to regulators 
and others, especially those operating within a dialogic and consultative 
model. Langevoort argues that where a gatekeeper’s corporate contacts do 
not exhibit the “visible markings of disloyalty: extreme selfishness, sloth, dis-
honesty, etc.” gatekeepers relax their guard and are more receptive to their 
clients’ accounts of reality.102 The positive disposition toward firm conduct is 
contagious, too, where authoritative figures publicly support it and where an 
attitudinal cascade develops. Because the change happens over time, it is 
poorly perceived.103 
                                                                    
100  Sharon Gilad, “Overcoming Commitment to Internal Compliance via Reframing and 
Delegation” Regulation & Governance [forthcoming] [Gilad, “Overcoming”]. 
101  Donald C Langevoort, “Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s 
Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Risk-Taking” (2011) 96:5 Cornell L Rev 
1209 [Langevoort, “Greased Pig”]. Gatekeepers in financial regulation are those reputa-
tional intermediaries—accountants, lawyers, etc.—responsible for validating and vouch-
ing for the conduct of their clients. See generally John C Coffee Jr, Gatekeepers: The Role 
of the Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
102  In his view, however, the markers of hard work, intensity, optimism and enthusiasm by 
people within an organization can actually be telltale indicators of an adaptive bias to-
ward over-optimism within a firm. While adaptive for the firm in a competitive market 
place, the same highly culture serves to support a strong in-group versus out-group cul-
ture, to deflect doubt and uncertainty, and to be unrealistic about difficult realities that 
may threaten the firm’s identity or competitiveness. Langevoort, “Greased Pig” supra note 
101 at 8–11.  
103  See e.g. Eugene Volokh, “The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope” (2003) 116:4 Harv L 
Rev 1026 at 1105–14. 
620 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL. 44:3 
 
The problem of under-definition was exacerbated by the challenges posed 
by complexity and ever-faster innovation, which profoundly affected regula-
tors’ capacity.104 Particularly in situations characterized by informational in-
security, decision makers may be more inclined to “satisfice” or to imitate 
others’ responses.105 This uncertainty would have affected both regulators’ 
and industry actors’ behaviour. 
The disconnect between firms’ evaluations of risk and actual manifesta-
tions of risk, ex post, was not inevitably the result of nefarious conduct. 
There were surely many incidences of gaming and conscious shirking of regu-
latory responsibilities. The debate about whether the financial crisis was the 
product of “greed or stupidity”106 remains unresolved. (Presumably, different 
firms exhibited different degrees of each at different moments.) Beyond the 
egregious cases, though, the combination of vagueness around regulatory 
expectations and human psychological and organizational frailty adversely 
affected regulatory effectiveness. The impact is of real significance for proc-
ess-based regulation generally. 
IV. RESPONSIVE REGULATION ON THE EVE OF ITS THIRD 
DECADE 
In the run-up to the financial crisis, many financial sector regulators em-
braced the notion that self-interest and market discipline would promote 
responsibility on their own, embraced industry innovation as an unmitigated 
good, embraced the notion (not wrong, but perhaps overstated by industry 
in its own interest) that the speed and complexity of financial markets meant 
that regulators had little choice but to follow industry’s lead, and relied in-
creasingly on information produced by industry, not produced independ-
ently. In the aggregate, this regulatory stance conveys the influence of “macro 
                                                                    
104  See e.g. Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity”, supra note 32 at 2–3 (describing complexity 
as the “greatest financial market challenge of the future”). 
105  See e.g. Paul J DiMaggio & Walter W Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields” (1983) 48:2 Am Soc 
Rev 147.  
106  David Brooks, “Greed and Stupidity”, The New York Times (3 April 2009) A29, online: 
<http://www.nytimes.com>. 
2011 MACRO- AND MICRO-LEVEL EFFECTS 621 
 
level” agenda-setting power on regulatory design. As a consequence, regula-
tors developed a chastened understanding of their own capacity and a 
heightened sense of the virtue and brilliance of industry. Regulatory capacity 
and status diminished, and regulators reacted predictably to their circum-
scribed mandate. At the “micro level” of implementational choices, as well, 
regulators did not have in place the kinds of robust learning systems that 
meta-regulation would have advocated. Consequently, in the face of gaps in 
their own knowledge, regulators ceded too much of the power to ascribe 
content to regulatory principles to industry alone. They did not engage in 
insistent, probing conversations with industry around their precise under-
standings of what constituted “compliance”, meaning that there really was no 
meeting of the minds around what “compliance” entailed. Problems deriving 
from overconfidence, which could have been anticipated, were not ad-
dressed. Problems associated with complexity and uncertainty, and their ef-
fects on both human decision making and regulatory capacity, were not 
grappled with. Nor does industry seem to have done better, or appreciated 
the consequence of embedding consequential risks analytical decisions into 
non-human computer code. Because regulators failed to manage change in 
conscious ways—by failing to record their own learning or to track move-
ment over time in the meaning of terms, such as “adequate disclosure” or 
“material risk”—they failed to intervene in a downward behavioural cascade. 
Perhaps because the circle within which they operated was too narrow and 
homogeneous, regulators were not saved, through tripartism, from “harmful 
capture” in the way that Ayres’ and Braithwaite’s responsive regulation ap-
proach suggests they might have been.107 This experience in financial regula-
tion suggests that we must take seriously the very considerable regulatory 
capacity necessary to make flexible regulation work right. 
Stepping back further, the worry with regard to some forms of flexible 
regulation is that they may not address the ways in which these layered sto-
ries of power under specification, and behavioural psychology can influence 
regulators’ ability to penetrate firm accounts and to evaluate compliance 
adequacy for themselves. The very attributes of responsive regulation that 
make it so compelling as a response to overly rigid, command-and-control 
                                                                    
107  Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 9. 
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regulation—its flexibility, and its responsiveness to evolving context and to 
individual actors’ conduct—have, in the economic and political circum-
stances of the past decade and the financial industry, had the effect of un-
dermining regulatory and enforcement effectiveness in subtle but ultimately 
significant ways. Unless very carefully designed, dialogic mechanisms gener-
ally will be ill-suited to resisting either macro shifts in political culture, or 
micro shifts in under-the-radar implementation. Scholars such as Julia Black, 
who have developed compelling and insightful stories around the essential 
preconditions and critical success factors for regulatory conversations108 or 
for principles-based regulation,109 have not fully addressed the underlying 
risk of “creep” associated with iterative, discursive regulation. This is not to 
say that regulators always fail to take appropriate action to guide industry 
conduct.110 Given the events of the financial crisis, however, we should not 
assume that those efforts are the norm. It is more likely that in that historical 
context, most regulatory staffers and policy makers had at best a dim or par-
tial awareness of how far from safety financial practice had actually strayed.  
Returning to the subject of this volume, responsive regulation, these cir-
cumstances undermined the regulatory pyramid and negatively affected the 
regulator’s credibility and perceived effectiveness in at least three ways. First, 
the phenomena above succeeded in considerably shifting the regulatory 
ground rules, in an under-the-radar manner, without triggering alarm bells. 
This suggests that responsive regulatory strategies based on improved pre-
vention through improved detection, such as identifying hot spots where 
prior misconduct was concentrated,111 could be of limited utility in detecting 
these subtler shifts in time to prevent problems. Second, and relatedly, there 
                                                                    
108  Julia Black, “Talking about Regulation” [1998] PL 77 (identifying the importance of (1) 
structuring conversations; (2) commitment; (3) access; (4) authority; and (5) trust and 
accountability to effective and legitimate regulatory conversations). 
109  Black, “Making a Success”, supra note 87 at 200–03 (identifying eight critical success 
factors for principles-based securities regulation, including the development of “criteria to 
identify the appropriate balance between principles and other types of rules”; “discipline 
and restraint in the provision of . . . guidance”; and “developing and maintaining a con-
structive dialogue between regulator and regulated firm”). 
110  See e.g. MacNeil, supra note 99; Gilad, “Overcoming”, supra note 100. 
111  See e.g. Braithwaite, “Negative Licensing”, supra note 5 at 440. 
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was a clear cost in terms of transparency and effectiveness. Financial industry 
regulators such as the SEC and the FSA arguably embraced innovation to 
such a degree that industry innovation utterly outstripped regulators’ ability 
to stay abreast of developments within their remit. In short order, complexity 
increased to the point that financial products exceeded the bounds of gov-
ernability or even comprehensibility.112 Third, the evolving zeitgeist, in 
which many accepted too sweepingly the beneficial nature of innovation, 
failing to recognize that some innovation was undertaken precisely to limit 
transparency or circumvent regulatory requirements,113 would have had an 
impact on internal firm worldviews and individual status. This would have 
compromised the possibility of the restorative justice moments that John 
Braithwaite envisions, during which the “wise old heads of banking” could 
seize on the opportunity presented by a restorative justice confrontation to 
address dangerous risk-shifting in their banks.114 In the midst of a pervasive 
narrative about the wisdom of modern financial engineering to manage risks, 
it is unlikely that those warnings would have been heard, even if they had 
been voiced.115 
This is not a Hobbesian picture. As the narrative above tries to establish, 
dialogue, with an active, well-informed, critically thinking, and public-
minded regulatory presence, has the affirmative power to change perspectives 
and even the rules of the game. As Ayres and Braithwaite note, there is “dis-
order in the multiple self ”. That is, “business actors are bundles of contradic-
tory commitments to values of economic rationality, law abidingness, and 
business responsibility. Business executives have profit-maximizing selves and 
law-abiding selves; at different moments, in different contexts, the different 
selves prevail.”116 The response to the frailties of flexible, dialogue based sys-
                                                                    
112  See Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity”, supra note 72. 
113  Turner Review, supra note 73. 
114  Braithwaite, “Negative Licensing”, supra note 5 at 447. 
115  See e.g. Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and 
Deviance at NASA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Langevoort, “Greased 
Pig” supra note 101 at 9 (considering the literature on the ways in which organizational 
hierarchy silences dissent). 
116  Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 9 at 31. 
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tems to power, then, is not to terminate dialogue but rather to engage more 
strongly and insistently with it. 
Among the lessons that the financial crisis has provided, we have learned 
that regulatory credibility matters. Relative to more “soft law” regulatory 
approaches, responsive regulation has fared well because of its emphasis on 
maintaining a robust regulatory and enforcement presence, in the form of a 
“benign big gun” and a tit-for-tat enforcement pyramid structure. Moreover, 
building a credible enforcement pyramid requires that regulators possess in-
dependent-mindedness and adequate resources (in absolute and relative 
terms).117 Flexible regulation, like any other regulatory approach, needs to be 
aware of and to consciously build in mechanisms to respond to its own rela-
tive frailties.118 Regulators should consider making more conscious use of 
tools like prophylactic rules, for example, to control the terms of an other-
wise principles-level debate and help conserve regulatory resources. Gener-
ally speaking, the regulator should also bring a degree of skepticism to its 
dealings with industry. One may signal a desire to cooperate and view resis-
tance as an opportunity to learn how to improve regulatory design,119 but it 
would be unwise to assume that industry actors necessarily come to the table 
in good faith.  
We have also learned that, in the absence of conscious effort, no one may 
be immune from over-optimistic bubble thinking and other human psycho-
logical frailties. As Donald Langevoort suggests, noteworthy firm optimism, 
or broad consensus that “this time is different”, should be perceived as a po-
                                                                    
117  See Ford, “Expert Panel”, supra note 40 at 32–33 (discussing in more detail what consti-
tutes adequate staff in the context of principles-based securities regulation). See also Ford, 
“Principles”, supra note 47 at 288–93. 
118  See Samuel L Bray, “Power Rules” (2010) 110:4 Colum L Rev 1172 at 1173. The strate-
gies put forward here, such as prophylactic rules and increasing regulatory capacity, can be 
understood as what Bray has called “power rules”. These are strategies designed not to di-
rectly regulate conduct that is perceived to be harmful, but rather to “regulate conduct or 
conditions that are not themselves perceived as harmful but which contribute to human 
power or vulnerability”. Efforts to break up banks that are deemed “too big to fail” are also 
power rules on this definition, though they are less specifically concerned with flexible 
and iterative systems. 
119  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 36. 
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tential warning sign, and not as a reason to fall in.120 We also know a good 
deal more now than we did twenty years ago about the limitations of human 
and organizational decision-making capacity, including the capacity to deal 
with change. 
Perhaps most salient to flexible regulation in the financial context, we 
have learned that regulators abdicate their responsibility where they imple-
ment flexible, iterative, collaborative systems without simultaneously devel-
oping mechanisms to “kick the tires” on industry-generated solutions. A 
regulator needs to consciously build in institutional learning and memory 
functions that allow it to learn from experience, to investigate causal relation-
ships, to channel, understand, and respond to change and track “creep” in 
practice or attitudes, and to interrogate its own assumptions. Where change 
is fast and constant and regulation is designed to permit that change, the 
mechanisms and background conditions through which it happens should be 
taken especially seriously. Arguably, some of the root problems underlying 
regulatory failure prior to and during the financial crisis were an over-
embrace of change, and a failure to grapple with pervasive uncertainty. In 
other words, they were problems that might have been addressed through a 
robust meta-regulatory approach that focused on building learning systems 
to respond to the “holes”—the gaps in knowledge and understanding—
rather than the ostensibly known elements. 
It may be that the main lesson we have learned is that nature abhors a 
vacuum, and if regulatory design does not provide for ways to manage uncer-
tainty, then other forces, including self-interested action by powerful actors, 
or deflection (by industry through excessive reliance on risk modeling com-
puter code, for example, or by regulators through excessive delegation to in-
dustry) will. As Professor Braithwaite’s contribution to this volume makes 
clear, responsive regulation circa 2011 is an approach based on in built 
mechanisms for learning through experience. In other words, it is evolving 
into a meta-regulatory approach. Consistent with meta-regulation, the ex-
perience of the financial crisis, and the effects of “macro level” power and 
“micro level” implementation decisions in its creation, are yet another set of 
                                                                    
120  Langevoort, “Greased Pig”, supra note 101 at 30–31. 
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data points to be incorporated into the ongoing learning method that re-
sponsive regulation represents. 
